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The Concept of ‘Human Dignity’
in the Post-War Human Rights Debates
Hanna-Mari Kivistö1
AbstrAct
The paper explores early post-war human rights language by looking at 
the drafting of the first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948), with a focus especially on the concept of ‘dignity’. ‘Human dignity’ 
has been regarded as a central, even undisputable concept in discourse related 
to human rights since the Second World War. The first article of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights states how “All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience 
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. By looking 
at the preparatory work on the first article, and the related political choices 
and conceptual disputes, the paper will emphasise the political and rhetorical 
character of the concept of ‘human dignity’.
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IntroductIon
The first article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
(henceforth, the Declaration) states how “All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience 
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. The purpose 
of this paper is to look at human rights language in the immediate post World 
War II period by considering the drafting process of the first article, focusing 
especially on the notion of ‘dignity’.
1 University of Jyväskylä. E-mail: hanna-mari.kivisto@jyu.fi. This paper is part of the 
project The Politics of Dissensus (Academy of Finland).
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The idea of human dignity is old, with various theological and philosophi-
cal roots (see e.g. Sensen 2011). After the Second World War ‘human dignity’ 
became a central concept in human rights discourse and a key concept of 
legal language both at the international level as well as in domestic constitu-
tions. A famous example of the latter is the 1949 Grundgesetz of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, which affirms the inviolability of human dignity in its 
first article.2
During the drafting process of the Declaration, the first article was empha-
sised as the foundation for the document. René Cassin stated that the Article 1 
was the framework “within which all the rights that followed were contained” 
(A/C.3/SR.96, 99). The Declaration refers to human dignity as the justifica-
tion for other rights claims (see also Sensen 2011).
The paper will look into the political choices and conceptual disputes be-
hind the creation of the first article of the Declaration, and by doing so it 
hopes to shed light on the rhetorical and political continuities and disconti-
nuities related to the dignity concept in the post war debates. In addition to 
offering a brief interpretation of the political history of the first article, the 
paper aims also to say something more general about the politics of drafting 
and negotiating, with reference to the UN debates used as the primary refer-
ence material.
drAftIng the unIversAl declArAtIon of humAn rIghts
The Preamble of the 1945 Charter of the United Nations calls on states 
“to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large 
and small”.3
According to Chaskalson (2002, 133) the wording was a radical move, 
as it was the first time the idea of dignity was proclaimed in a document of 
international law. Although it had been codified in the legal systems of some 
states already before the war, ‘human dignity’ became a prominent concept 
of legal language only in 1940s (Dicke 2002, 112). The movement for human 
rights, inspired in part by Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms”, resulted in different 
drafts of the “International Bill of Rights” written by individuals and various 
organisations. Some of these drafts included a reference to dignity, albeit with 
differing kinds of dignity conceptions, stemming from different religious and 
philosophical traditions (ibid., 112-14).
2 The Article 1(1) of the 1949 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: “Human 
dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”
3 The Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945.
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Even if the Declaration marks a historical turning point and is a stand-
ard-setting document in human rights discussions, it is perhaps surprising 
to notice that human rights were rather peripheral in the early days of the 
United Nations, which was established for maintaining of post-war interna-
tional peace and security (see Glendon 2002, xv). The UN Charter of 1945, 
however, set up a Human Rights Commission, which agreed to draft a bill of 
rights (Hunt 2007, 203). The Commission was chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, 
who undoubtedly is one of the most famous figures in the early history of the 
Declaration. Among the other members of the Commission were names such 
as René Cassin and John Peter Humphrey. Humphrey was the director of the 
Division of Human Rights and wrote the first draft of the Declaration (Hunt 
2007, 203; Morsink 1999, 28-9).
Before the General Assembly finally approved the Declaration on Decem-
ber 10, 1948, the drafting process had gone through several stages and various 
forums. Apart from the Commission on Human Rights, the draft was circu-
lated in the member states, and it was approved by the Economic and Social 
Council. The Third Committee on Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs 
debated the document and its various articles thoroughly. These debates com-
prise the main reference material of this paper.
Although it might well be that the “origins of documents do not necessar-
ily tell us something significant about their consequences”, as Hunt (2007, 
18) argues, the point in studying the drafting documents from a rhetorical 
and conceptual perspective is rather that such documents are primary sources 
when looking into the complexities, controversies and compromises behind 
particular concepts or labels. Another point to emphasise in relation to the 
preparatory work is that the drafting debates and negotiations –which could 
also be characterised as quasi-parliamentary– produce a first-hand picture of 
the particular time in focus, of its political constellations and of the contem-
porary political language (see Ihalainen & Palonen 2009). A further point in 
relation to studying the preparatory work is that, by using such material, one 
can construct a reading that shows the historical contingency related to the 
concepts and conventions, especially those that might seem normative, or 
even ‘foundational’ from today’s perspective, such as the concept of ‘human 
dignity’.
Glendon (2002) speaks of the post-war window of opportunity when 
major institutions such as the United Nations could be established before the 
dividing lines between the Cold War blocks became too great. Those who 
gathered together to draft the Declaration came from diverse cultural, linguis-
tic and political backgrounds (Glendon 2002, xix).
This aspect, related to the politics of negotiating, drafting and defining, 
is wonderfully covered by Eleanor Roosevelt, who, when discussing the pre-
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paratory debates of the Declaration, writes: “Perhaps one of the things that 
some of us learned was that in international documents you must try to find 
words that can be accepted by the greatest number of people. Not the words 
you would choose as the perfect words, but the words that most people can 
say and that will accomplish the ends you will desire, and will be acceptable 
to practically everyone sitting around the table, no matter what their back-
ground, no matter what their beliefs might be” (Roosevelt 1995, 560).
Post-wAr nAturAl rIghts lAnguAge
The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights speaks of the 
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights 
of all members of the human family”. The phrase “all members of the human 
family” refers to the idea of the universality of the document. Terms such as 
“inherent”, “inalienable”, “born free and equal” make references to the idea 
of natural rights (Morsink 1984, 333) and, as several scholars have noted, 
echo the language of the declarations of the eighteenth century. Article 1 of 
the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), for 
example, proclaimed that “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights” 
(see Hunt 2007, 17; Morsink 1984). It should, however, be noted that in list-
ing the rights, the 1948 Declaration goes much further than its Enlightenment 
predecessors (Morsink 1999).
The post-war era brought about the revival of natural law language as a 
counter-reaction to positivism, which had dominated legal thinking during 
the latter part of the previous century and the first decade of the twentieth 
century (see Kelsen 1957, 174). Although having various philosophical and 
religious roots, a key idea in natural rights thinking is, as Morsink (1984, 333) 
explains, that human beings posses certain moral rights on the basis of being 
human, and these rights thus exist prior to the rights expressed in the systems 
of positive law. Their “origin does not lie in the legal enactments of states 
or legislatures, but in the nature and order of things, especially the nature of 
man” (ibid.).
According to Jacques Maritain, a Catholic natural law philosopher who 
was also involved in the drafting of the Declaration, “the human person pos-
sesses rights because of the very fact that it is a person, a whole, a master of 
itself and of its acts, and which consequently is not merely a means to an end, 
but an end, an end which must be treated as such” (Maritain 1949, 65). To 
Maritain the expression “dignity of human person” “means nothing if it does 
not signify that by virtue of natural law, the human person has the right to be 
respected, is the subject of rights, possesses rights. There are things which are 
owed to man because of the very fact that he is man” (ibid.).
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As Dicke (2002) writes, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights re-
fers to the “recognition” of dignity as the foundation for freedom, justice and 
peace. The idea is that there is an obligation to recognise dignity, but impor-
tantly, recognition does not constitute human dignity, nor does the notion of 
dignity need recognition to exist (Dicke 2002, 114). Inherent dignity is thus 
understood as a quality possessed by “all members of the human family” in-
dependently of the state.
The purpose of the following section is to look into conceptual disputes 
related to dignity in the drafting of the first article of the Declaration. It makes 
references especially to the debates of the Third Committee, which took place 
in Paris in autumn 1948. The Third Committee consisted of representatives of 
the 58 UN member states, and it considered the draft International Declara-
tion of Human Rights prepared by the Commission on Human Rights.4 The 
deliberations on the first article lasted several days. Glendon (2002) quotes 
Roosevelt who, unhappy with the lengthy debates in the Committee, writes 
how the numerous delegates debated “every single word of that draft declara-
tion over and over again” (Glendon 2002, 143).
delIberAtIng over the fIrst ArtIcle
The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states how 
“disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts 
which have outraged the conscience of mankind”. The Declaration was thor-
oughly shaped by the experiences of the past, and against that politico-his-
torical backdrop, its preamble and first article references to human dignity 
make a strong statement by itself. According to René Cassin, the text of his 
early draft declaration5 “alluded to the three fundamental questions of liberty, 
equality, and fraternity because, during the war, these great fundamental prin-
ciples of mankind had been forgotten” (E/CN.4/AC.I/SR.8, 2).
Roosevelt explained that the Human Rights Commission had included the 
word “dignity” “in order to emphasize the inherent dignity of all mankind” 
(A/C.3/SR.98, 110). In the Third Committee deliberations Cassin opposed 
suggestions that the principles of Article 1 should be transferred to the Pre-
amble, or that the ideas in general would be too well known to need to be 
repeated in the text of the Declaration. He emphasised how “within the pre-
ceding ten years, millions of men had lost their lives precisely because those 
4 The drafting documents referred to in this article can be found online at http://www.
un.org/Depts/dhl/udhr/meetings_1946_nuclear.shtml
5 The draft text for Article 1: “All men are brothers. Being endowed with reason, members 
of one family they are free and possess equal dignity and rights”. Commission on Human Rights, 
drafting committee. Draft International Declaration of Rights, 16 June 1947. E/C.4/AC.1/W.1
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principles had been ruthlessly flouted. Barbarism, which men had thought 
safely buried, had risen once more to stalk the world. It was essential that the 
United Nations should again proclaim to mankind those principles which had 
come so close to extinction and should explicitly refute the abominable doc-
trine of fascism” (A/C.3/SR.96, 99).
Although the first article of the Declaration has similarities with the eight-
eenth century language of natural rights, its wording makes no reference to 
any transcendent source for rights, as opposed to the Enlightenment dec-
larations (see Morsink 1999, 282). It is, however, interesting to notice that 
the drafts of the Commission on Human Rights (“the Geneva Draft” 1947; 
“the Lake Success Draft” 1948) both contained a reference to nature with the 
wording: “All human beings are by nature free and equal”6 (E/600; E/800). 
Further, the Brazilian proposal for Article 1 included an amendment stat-
ing that all human beings were “created in the image and likeness of God”7 
(A/C.3/215) (see also Morsink 1999).
The above-mentioned wordings sparked a lively debate in the Third Com-
mittee. The delegate of Belgium, Henry Carton de Wiart, for example, op-
posed the phrase “by nature”, claiming that it was “ambiguous and would lead 
to long, philosophical arguments”. According to him, the reference to God 
in the Brazilian amendment was of “particularly delicate character” (A/C.3/
SR.96, 96).
The representative of China, P.C. Chang, supported the Belgian position 
to delete the phrase “by nature”, stating that the measure “would obviate any 
theological question, which could not and should not be raised in a decla-
ration designed to be universally applicable”. He referred to the ideals and 
traditions that the population of China had, which were different from those 
of the Christian West. Even if the ideals and traditions were regarded to be 
of utmost importance, he would refrain from proposing that they should be 
mentioned in the document. He hoped that “his colleagues would show equal 
consideration and withdraw some of the amendments to article 1 which raised 
metaphysical problems” (A/C.3/SR.96, 98).
Chang later referred to eighteenth century philosophies about the nature 
of man, which according to him should be understood as the basis for Article 
1. Chang saw no contradiction between the “eighteenth century idea of good-
ness of man’s essential nature and the idea of a soul given to man by God”. 
According to him, “If the words ‘by nature’ were deleted, those who believed 
6 The draft article: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They 
are endowed by nature with reason and conscience, and should act towards one another in a spirit 
of brotherhood.”
7 “Created in the image and likeness to God, they are endowed with reason and con-
science, and should act towards one another in the spirit of brotherhood”.
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in God could still find in the strong opening assertion of the article the idea 
of God, and at the same time others with different concepts would be able to 
accept the text” (A/C.3/SR.98, 113-14).
Jorge Carrera Andrade, the representative of Ecuador, emphasised the first 
article “as a doctrinal statement, rather than a statement of human rights”. 
He saw that “in many parts of the world, men were not born free and equal”, 
and the Declaration was “to remedy that situation”. He did not support the 
Brazilian amendment and argued that there should be distinction between the 
“divine” and the “human”, and the drafters should refrain from “placing the 
divine on the political plan by introducing it into the declaration”, as the Dec-
laration was intended for people of all faiths (A/C.3/SR.96, 100).
In contrast to the Ecuadorian perspective, the representative of Argentina, 
Enrique V. Corominas, did not see any conflict between religion and politics. 
According to him the Brazilian amendment had “no intention of imposing 
any one philosophy of faith on any group or human being”. He emphasised 
that the first article of the draft declaration, i.e. prior to the reference to God, 
“constituted a dogma rather than a statement of rights”. He felt a reference to 
God would give the article additional strength: “It would then rise above mere 
politics and bring peace and tranquillity to the soul of man”. As freedom of 
religion was guaranteed in one of the subsequent articles, he pointed out that 
“all groups of human beings could still profess whatever faith or philosophy 
they chose”. Reference to God would, however, give the first article “an ele-
ment of universality, a breath of the divine” (A/C.3/SR.98, 109).
One of the delegates of France, Salymon Grumbach, rejected the Brazilian 
amendment by stating that it was not appropriate to include a statement on 
human origins to which all representatives could not agree. According to him 
“the Committee’s essential aim was to reach agreement on fundamental prin-
ciples, which could be put into practice” and “endorsed by believers as well as 
non-believers”. He referred to Jacques Maritain as “the great Catholic”, who 
had stated that “the nations should try to reach agreement on a declaration of 
human rights, but that it was useless to try to reach agreement on the origin of 
these rights” (A/C.3/SR.99, 116-17).
The representative of India, Lakshmi Menon, emphasised the idea of uni-
versality by stating that “although different countries had different beliefs and 
political systems, they shared the same ideals of social justice and freedom”. 
The purpose of the Declaration for him “was to set forth those ideals and find 
a basis for agreement acceptable for all” (A/C.3/SR.99, 116).
Not all representatives, however, agreed with the notion of universality. 
C.T. Te Water of South Africa caused controversy when expressing his op-
position to the universal application of dignity by claiming that “there could 
be no universality in the concept of equality, there could not be, neither was 
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there, any universal standard among the peoples of the world in their different 
concepts of human dignity, which were, surely, determined by the differences 
in religious and social systems, usages and customs” (A/C.3/SR.95, 92). The 
representative of Saudi Arabia, Jamil Baroody, claimed that the idea that all 
human beings were endowed with reason and conscience was “too broad 
a statement, one that was not, and had never been true”. According to him, 
using the words “dignity and rights” in the first sentence was “too ambiguous 
and had different meanings in different countries” (A/C.3/SR.99, 122). Cas-
sin replied to Baroody by saying that the Committee, as “representative of 
the human community”, was “competent to proclaim such an ideal” (A/C.3/
SR.99, 124).
As Morsink (1984, 316) notes, another important expression for the first 
article, and one that underlines the conception that dignity belongs to eve-
ryone independently of the acts of law-makers, is the wording “are born”. 
The expression was much disputed in the Third Committee. For example, the 
representative of Iraq, A. Abadi, claimed that the authors of the first article of 
the draft declaration had been “carried away by its emotional content”, their 
definition being “reminiscent of Rousseau and of the French revolution”, but 
lacking clarity and originality. The Iraqi proposal was to replace the phrase 
“are born” with the phrase “should be free and equal”8 (A/C.3/SR.96, 100).
To the representative of the USSR, Alexei Pavlov, “the theory that all men 
were born free and equal represented a somewhat shaky basis for the declara-
tion”. According to him, the equality of rights before the law was not deter-
mined by birth, but by the social structure of the state and the law. Human 
beings had to be considered as members of society, and that status determined 
their rights and duties. He also criticised the phrase “spirit of brotherhood” 
by referring to the exploitation of weak nations by strong ones. Accordingly, 
Pavlov argued that the drafters should not be hypocritical, and that the first 
article “should be realistic and state only what existed or could be attained at 
the current state of the human development” (A/C.3/SR.98, 110).
The phrase “are born” shows clearly the differing rights conceptions of the 
drafters. To Pavlov no rights could exist beyond the state; there were no ‘in-
herent’ human rights. The representative of Bolivia, Eduardo Anze Matienzo, 
criticised this position and, as a response to the Soviet critique of the term 
“brotherhood”, he noted that the draft declaration did not claim that human 
beings were perfect. Rather, the declaration was “designed to set a goal for 
mankind” and it should “inspire men to transform into realities the principles 
it proclaimed” (A/C.3/SR.98, 112-13).
8 The Iraqi proposal for Article 1: “All men should be free and equal in dignity and worth 
and should be entitled to similar treatment and equal opportunities” (A/C.3/237).
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Grumbach of France later returned to answer the Soviet critique and to 
defend the wording “are born”. He stressed that all representatives knew that 
inequality existed, but the point was that “the right to freedom and equality 
was inherent from the moment of birth”. Grumbach made reference to the 
drafters of the “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen” who 
“had fully realised the existence of inequality and social injustice, but they 
felt it essential to affirm their belief in man’s inherent right to equality and 
freedom” (A/C.3/SR.99, 116), emphasising thus the importance of the ideals 
which the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed, as well as the 
political character of the act of declaring such ideals.
concludIng remArKs
The idea of this paper has been to explore the human rights language in 
the immediate post-war period by looking into the drafting process of Article 
1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with reference especially to 
the concept of ‘human dignity’.
Studying the drafting documents shows the rhetoric, political choices and 
historical contingencies related to the concept of dignity in the Declaration. 
The first article and its language should be understood in its post-war politico-
historical context, including the political experiences that were the driving 
force behind its creation. It should also be emphasised that the final wording 
of Article 1 does not refer, for example, to any transcendent source of rights. 
Although these issues were addressed and debated during the drafting stages, 
and differing perspectives were presented, the drafters were very particular 
in providing a wording that could be acceptable to representatives from vari-
ous political, philosophical and religious backgrounds. Accordingly, the con-
cept of dignity was also kept obscure and open-ended. The rhetoric related 
to natural rights embraces the universality of the notion of dignity. Dignity is 
emphasised as something that is to be recognised, belongs to everyone and is 
intended to justify the rights claims of the document.
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